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AN EXHAUSTING IDEA: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
EXAMINES THE IDEA EXHAUSTION 
REQUIREMENT IN STEWART v. WACO 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Abstract: On March 14, 2013, in Stewart v. Waco Independent School Dis-
trict, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was 
not required to administratively exhaust her Rehabilitation Act claim under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In doing so, the Fifth 
Circuit created a precedent that could potentially flood court dockets and that 
does not make use of the administrative safeguards statutorily in place. This 
Comment argues that, on remand, the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas should apply a relief-centered approach to ultimately find that 
the plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies under the 
IDEA. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) currently ed-
ucates approximately 6.5 million special-education students.1 With the num-
ber of special-education court decisions on the rise, the IDEA is the fourth-
most litigated federal civil statute.2 Appreciating the burden that IDEA litiga-
tion imposes on courts, the statute requires IDEA students to administratively 
exhaust their claims prior to filing a civil action.3 
In 2010, Andricka Stewart, an IDEA student, brought suit under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) against the Waco Inde-
pendent School District without exhausting her administrative remedies, 
and thus put the scope of the exhaustion requirement in issue.4 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Miriam Kurtzig Freedman, Special Education: Its Ethical Dilemmas, Entitlement Status, 
and Suggested Systemic Reforms, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012). 
 2 See id. at 17–18 (citing to a study that reports an increase in the number of reported federal 
education cases from 623 decisions in the 1990s to 1242 decisions between 2000–2010); see also 
Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-State 
Survey, 21 J DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 4–6 (2010). 
 3 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006); see also Peter J. Ma-
her, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Re-
quirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259, 261 (2011) (discussing the IDEA’s exhaus-
tion requirement and arguing that this requirement applies to IDEA students but not to students 
only covered under Section 504 and the ADA). 
 4 Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. (Stewart I), 711 F.3d 513, 517, 527 (5th Cir.), opinion 
vacated and superseded on reh’g, No. 11-51067, 2013 WL 2398860 (5th Cir. June 3, 2013); see 
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district court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss without ad-
dressing the issue of administrative exhaustion, in March 2013, in Stewart v. 
Waco Independent School District (“Stewart I”), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not required to administra-
tively exhaust her Section 504 claim under the IDEA.5 
On March 28, 2013, the school district filed a petition for rehearing en 
banc, arguing that Stewart’s claim should be dismissed for failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies.6 The Fifth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition 
and, on June 3, 2013, vacated its prior opinion, with instructions to the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas to address whether the 
plaintiff’s Section 504 claim was barred by any alleged failure to exhaust 
remedies or any defenses that may be dispositive of the entire matter.7 
This Comment argues that courts should look to a plaintiff’s prayer for 
relief to determine whether Section 504 claims require IDEA exhaustion.8 
Part I examines the development of statutory protections for public school 
students with disabilities, the administrative exhaustion requirements under 
the IDEA, and the background of Stewart I.9 Part II then discusses the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Stewart I regarding the issue of administra-
tive exhaustion.10 Finally, Part III argues that courts should adopt the Ninth 
Circuit’s relief-centered approach because it best balances the competing 
policy concerns of preventing plaintiffs from avoiding IDEA exhaustion and 
holding schools liable for Section 504 relief not available under the IDEA.11 
Ultimately, this Comment urges the district court in Stewart II to apply the 
relief-centered approach to determine that Stewart was required to exhaust 
her administrative remedies under the IDEA.12 
                                                                                                                           
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794 (2006)). 
 5 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517, 530. 
 6 Petition for Rehearing En Banc for Appellee at 12–13, Stewart I, 711 F.3d 513 (No. 11-
51067). 
 7 Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. (Stewart II), No 11-51067, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1 (5th 
Cir. June 3, 2013). 
 8 See infra notes 64–84 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 13–48 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 49–63 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 64–84 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 64–84 and accompanying text. 
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I. SAFEGUARDS FOR DISABLED STUDENTS AND  
THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 
A. Statutory Protections for Disabled Students 
Congress has enacted three independent statutes to afford rights and 
protections to public school students with disabilities: the IDEA, Section 
504, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).13 
Under the IDEA, eligible students14 are entitled to a “free appropriate public 
education” (“FAPE”) in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”).15 To re-
ceive a FAPE in the LRE as defined by the IDEA, a student must have an 
Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) that is reasonably calculated to pro-
vide educational benefit.16 Educators and parents of a child covered by the 
IDEA must jointly develop an IEP for each year of the student’s educa-
tion.17 
The IDEA sets up a private enforcement system for the rights it cre-
ates, but is silent as to the availability of damages for those students and 
parents seeking recovery under the statute.18 Despite the IDEA’s silence, in 
1985, in Burlington School Committee v. Massachusetts Department of Ed-
ucation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts may order school authori-
ties to reimburse parents for their expenditures on a child’s private special 
education if reimbursement is necessary for that child to receive a FAPE.19 
Although the Court did not explicitly conclude that an IDEA remedy is lim-
ited to equitable compensation, at least six U.S. Courts of Appeals—the 
                                                                                                                           
 13  See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 
(1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. 
L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 201–205, 104 Stat. 327, 337–38 (1990) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2006)); Maher, supra note 3, at 261. 
 14 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (defining eligible students). In order to be eligible for IDEA protec-
tions, students must have one of ten enumerated disabilities: intellectual disabilities, hearing im-
pairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance, 
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other heath impairments, and specific 
learning disabilities. Id. 
 15 Id. § 1412; Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(discussing whether a school failed to provide an IDEA student with the free appropriate public 
education that the student was entitled to by refusing to allow the student to use a service dog). 
Under the IDEA, the “least restrictive environment” is defined as one where, to the maximum 
extent appropriate, “children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are nondisa-
bled.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 (2013). 
 16 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
 17 Id. § 1414(d); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that an 
IDEA student could seek a remedy under the IDEA because the student’s educators failed to de-
velop an IEP that specified what services they needed to provide). 
 18 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006) (stat-
ing that the court “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate”). 
 19 See Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
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Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—have held that 
monetary damages are unavailable under the IDEA.20 
Similar to the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA were enacted to afford 
rights and protection to students with disabilities.21 Both Section 504 and 
the ADA serve to prohibit disability discrimination.22 For students covered 
under Section 504 and the ADA,23 the statutes provide a private right of 
action that allows “victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion, or denial 
of benefits” to recover equitable or monetary relief.24 
Because the eligibility criteria under Section 504 and the ADA are 
much broader than under the IDEA, students covered by the IDEA are 
“double-covered” under Section 504 and the ADA.25 In turn, Congress has 
expressly provided that IDEA students are not barred from bringing claims 
under Section 504 and the ADA.26 Nevertheless, the IDEA requires that any 
Section 504 and ADA claims brought on behalf of students covered by the 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See, e.g., Polera, 288 F.3d at 484–86; Witte v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275–
76 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 867 
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996); Heidemann v. 
Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 980 
F.2d 382, 386–87 (6th Cir. 1992). For example, in 1996, in Charlie F., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit compared relief under the IDEA to other social welfare programs, such as 
medical care or housing, where compensation is not given in money damages but rather through 
benefits in kind. See 98 F.3d at 991. That court explained that the structure of the statute “with its 
elaborate provision for educational services” is inconsistent with monetary awards. See id. 
 21 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2006). 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Maher, supra note 3, at 266. 
 23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining the term disability with respect to an individual to mean 
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having an im-
pairment”); see also Maher, supra note 3, at 267 (“Unlike the IDEA, Section 504 [and the] ADA 
[do] not include enumerated categories of impairments as a requisite for eligibility.”). 
 24 Cayla v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., No. 5:10-CV-04312, 2012 WL 1038664, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012); see Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Damages 
are awardable under section 504.”). Most federal appeals courts have established that a plaintiff 
can recover monetary damages under Section 504 so long as the plaintiff alleges intentional dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126 (1st Cir. 2003); Delano-
Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 
1135–36 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 25 Maher, supra note 3, at 267, 277–78. 
 26 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006). In 1986, Con-
gress overturned the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Smith v. Robinson that held that the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”) (now the IDEA) precluded parents from bringing 
claims under Section 504 if they could have brought that claim under the EHA. See 468 U.S. 992, 
1021 (1984) (declaring that when a remedy that “might be provided under § 504 is provided with 
more clarity and preclusion under the EHA, a plaintiff may not circumvent or enlarge on the rem-
edies available under the EHA by resort to § 504”). The IDEA now provides that “[n]othing in this 
chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under 
. . . Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
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IDEA are subject to the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion procedures if the 
relief sought is “also available” under the IDEA.27 
B. Judicial Interpretation of IDEA Exhaustion as Applied to  
Double-Covered Students 
Under the IDEA, eligible students and their parents are guaranteed 
procedural safeguards with respect to the FAPE provision.28 According to 
these procedural safeguards, a plaintiff must meet an administrative exhaus-
tion requirement before filing a civil action.29 The detailed statutory exhaus-
tion requirement provides that, prior to bringing suit in state or district 
court, IDEA students and their parents must either seek relief through medi-
ation, an impartial due process hearing, or by filing a complaint with their 
state or local education agency.30 This exhaustion requirement gives state and 
local agencies “the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educa-
tional programs for disabled children,” allowing these agencies to exercise their 
education expertise. 31 Moreover, administrative exhaustion promotes judi-
cial economy, efficiency, and accuracy by allowing administrative experts to 
promptly resolve grievances.32 
The IDEA provides that its exhaustion requirement applies to any Sec-
tion 504 and ADA claims brought by a plaintiff, provided that the relief “is 
also available” under the IDEA.33 Notably, courts have inconsistently inter-
                                                                                                                           
 27 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
 28 Id. § 1415(a); see Anne E. Johnson, Note, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Alloca-
tion of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and 
Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 593 (2005) (discussing the administrative appeals process, 
one of the IDEA’s most prominent procedural safeguards). 
 29 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a), 1415(i)(2)(A). Federal courts are divided as to whether or not the 
exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Compare Cave, 514 F.3d at 245 (construing exhaustion as 
jurisdictional), with Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991 (holding that the “failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies does not deprive a court of jurisdiction; lack of exhaustion usually is waivable, as lack of 
jurisdiction is not”). Some courts interpret § 1415(l) as a provision that cannot be waived and must 
be plead in the complaint, thus limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. See MM ex 
rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002); Urban by Urban v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 725 (10th Cir. 1996). Conversely, the Ninth Circuit 
has held § 1415(l) to be a claims processing provision that defendants may offer as an affirmative 
defense. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 867. 
 30  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b), 1415(e), 1415(f), 
1415(i) (2006). 
 31 Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992); see Maher, supra 
note 3, at 295–96. 
 32 Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (explaining that IDEA exhaustion promotes judicial efficiency by 
giving federal courts the benefit of expert fact finding by state agencies that are devoted to the 
purpose of resolving IDEA issues); see Maher, supra note 3, at 295–96. 
 33 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Although Section 504 provides procedural safeguards similar to 
the IDEA, Section 504 does not require the same detailed administrative process. See 34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.36 (2013) (describing Section 504’s procedural safeguards to include notice, an opportunity 
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preted whether a Section 504 or ADA claim seeks relief “that is also availa-
ble” under the IDEA.34 Some courts have concluded that Section 504 claims 
for monetary damages do not require IDEA exhaustion.35 Most courts, how-
ever, have held that IDEA students seeking monetary damages under Sec-
tion 504 must exhaust administrative remedies, and that students cannot 
evade this requirement simply through “artful pleading.”36  
To help guide the issue of whether a Section 504 claim for monetary 
relief is “also available” under the IDEA, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have adopted the injury-centered approach.37 
Alternatively, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently 
adopted the relief-centered approach.38 As a result, it is difficult to predict 
when a court will be satisfied that monetary relief “is also available” under 
the IDEA in a compensatory way so as to require IDEA exhaustion.39 
                                                                                                                           
for the parents to examine relevant records, an impartial hearing, and a review procedure); Maher, 
supra note 3, at 270–71. 
 34 See Maher, supra note 3, at 279–80. 
 35 See Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in City and Cnty. of Denver, Colo., 233 F.3d 
1268, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that IDEA exhaustion was unnecessary for an ADA claim 
because the plaintiff sought monetary damages unavailable under the IDEA); W.B. v. Matula, 67 
F.3d 484, 494-96 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 
F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that IDEA exhaustion was unnecessary for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2006) claim because the plaintiff sought monetary damages unavailable under the IDEA). 
 36 See, e.g., Payne, 653 F.3d at 877 (reasoning that plaintiffs cannot avoid IDEA exhaustion 
through artful pleading); Polera, 288 F.3d at 488 (reasoning that seeking monetary damages does 
not allow the plaintiff to sidestep the IDEA exhaustion requirement); Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993 
(reasoning that the parents of a double-covered student had to administratively exhaust under 
IDEA prior to bringing a Section 504 claim for monetary damages to court); see also supra note 
20 and accompanying text (collecting cases holding that monetary damages are not available un-
der the IDEA). 
 37 See Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled by 
Payne, 653 F.3d 863; McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564, 568–69 (7th Cir. 
2004); Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Payne, 653 
F.3d at 874–75 (discussing the Seventh and Tenth Circuit’s injury-centered approach and overturn-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s prior adoption of the injury-centered approach). The injury-centered ap-
proach examines whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury in theory could have been redressed to any 
degree by resorting to administrative remedies under the IDEA. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 874–75. 
This approach essentially creates a situation where administrative exhaustion is required for any 
case that falls within the general “field” of educating disabled students. See id. at 875. 
 38 See id. at 875; infra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s 
relief-centered approach). The relief-centered approach examines a complaint’s prayer for relief 
when determining whether IDEA exhaustion is required. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 875. If the plain-
tiff is seeking an IDEA remedy, injunctive relief to alter an IEP, or a right that arises out of FAPE, 
then IDEA exhaustion is required. See id. 
 39 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 866–68 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s prior holding that a plaintiff’s 
Section 504 claim for monetary damages required IDEA exhaustion); McCormick, 374 F.3d at 569 
(holding that, under the injury-centered approach, a plaintiff’s Section 504 claim requesting mon-
ey damages did not require IDEA exhaustion); Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1063, 1068 (holding that, un-
der the injury-centered approach, a plaintiff’s Section 504 claim requesting money damages did 
require IDEA exhaustion). 
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C. Factual and Procedural History in Stewart I 
In Stewart I, the plaintiff, Andricka Stewart, alleged that she “suffer[ed] 
from mental retardation, speech impairment, and hearing impairment” and 
thus “qualifie[d] as a person with a disability under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.”40 As evidenced by her IEP, Stewart is 
double-covered under the IDEA.41 Stewart’s complaint additionally alleged 
that she was involved in three incidences of sexual abuse over two years.42 
Stewart brought suit against the school district in the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Texas, alleging violations of Section 504 due to the 
school district’s “gross mismanagement” of her IEP and failure to reasonably 
accommodate her disabilities.43 In her Section 504 claim, Stewart sought mone-
tary damages from the school district.44 The district court dismissed Stewart’s 
action in its entirety, finding that her claims attempted to hold the school district 
liable for the actions of a private actor.45 Stewart appealed only her Section 504 
claim to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.46 In Stewart I, the court 
concluded that Stewart “plausibly state[d] a claim that the [school district] 
committed gross misjudgment.”47 In 2013, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, va-
cated the Stewart I opinion and remanded to the district court with instructions to 
                                                                                                                           
 40 711 F.3d at 517; Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 4, Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. 
Dist., No. 10-cv-00311 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 41 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517; Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 1; 
see also supra notes 16 and 25 and accompanying text (explaining that students with IEPs are 
covered by the IDEA and also covered by Section 504 and the ADA). 
 42 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517; Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 5. Prior 
to these three incidents of alleged abuse, Stewart was involved in an incident involving sexual 
contact with another male student. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 4. The 
school district responded by modifying Stewart’s IEP to designate that she be separated from male 
students and remain under close supervision. Id. 
 43 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d. at 517–19 (explaining that, to establish a claim for disability dis-
crimination in the education context under Section 504, a plaintiff must allege that a school district 
“refused to provide reasonable accommodations” by presenting facts that create an inference of 
gross misjudgment); Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 7; see also Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). Stewart’s First Amended Complaint also al-
leged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006), a civil rights 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 2. 
 44 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 529; Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 40, at 12. 
 45 Stewart I, 711 F.3d. at 517; Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 5, Stewart v. Waco Indep. 
Sch. Dist., No. 10-cv-00311 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2011); see supra note 5 and accompanying text 
(noting that the district court in Stewart I did not approach the issue of administrative exhaustion). 
 46 Stewart I, 711 F.3d. at 517. 
 47 Id. at 525. The court in Stewart I concluded that “gross misjudgment—a species of height-
ened negligence—applies to the [school] [d]istrict’s refusal to make reasonable accommodations 
by further modifying Stewart’s IEP.” Id. at 524. 
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determine whether the issue of administrative exhaustion is dispositive of the 
entire matter.48 
II. IDEA EXHAUSTION IN STEWART I 
In Stewart v. Waco Independent School District (Stewart I), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Stewart was not required to 
administratively exhaust her Section 504 claim under the IDEA.49 The ma-
jority emphasized that Stewart’s Section 504 claim did not seek damages 
“as a substitute for relief under the IDEA” and therefore the Section 1415(l) 
exhaustion requirement did not apply.50 
The conclusion in Stewart I is premised on the Ninth Circuit’s “relief-
centered” approach.51 Under this approach, “when determining whether the 
IDEA requires a plaintiff to [administratively] exhaust [a claim], courts should 
start by looking at a complaint’s prayer for relief.”52 If the relief sought is not 
also available under the IDEA, Section 1415(l) does not require exhaustion.53 
Nevertheless, IDEA exhaustion is required by the relief-centered approach 
when a plaintiff seeks: (1) an IDEA remedy or its functional equivalent, such as 
compensatory damages for the cost of private education; (2) injunctive relief to 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Stewart II, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1. 
 49 See 711 F.3d 513, 530 (5th Cir. 2013), opinion vacated and superseded on reh’g, No. 11-
51067, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1 (5th Cir. June 3, 2013). The record shows that Stewart did not 
exhaust her administrative remedies even though school personnel regularly notified her and her 
guardian of their right to seek a due process hearing and review by the district court. Waco Indep. 
Sch. Dist.’s Motion Presenting Defenses at 7, Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 10-cv-00311 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014). 
 50 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 530; see also Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are 
not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably have 
been redressed by the IDEA.”). Not dispositive of this opinion, but mentioned by the majority, 
was whether exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 528. The dissent 
raised the issue of administrative exhaustion sua sponte, despite the fact that neither party raised 
the issue on appeal. See id. at 527; id. at 531 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The school district 
explicitly stated that Stewart was ineligible to recover under the IDEA. See id. at 527 (majority 
opinion). This statement would appear to nullify any 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) exhaustion requirement. 
See id.; see also Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006). The 
majority reasoned that the dissent’s only reason for raising the issue of IDEA exhaustion “would 
have to be an implicit conclusion—unstated and unexamined—that the IDEA considers the issue 
jurisdictional.” Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 527–28; see supra note 29 (discussing the circuit split re-
garding whether IDEA exhaustion is jurisdictional). 
 51 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 529 & n.25 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit relied on, but did not 
fully adopt, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis); Payne, 653 F.3d at 875 (applying the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach). 
 52 Payne, 653 F.3d at 875. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the relief-centered approach more 
aptly reflects the meaning of IDEA exhaustion because it examines whether the plaintiff actually 
sought relief under the IDEA as opposed to whether the plaintiff could have sought relief under 
the IDEA. See id. 
 53 Id. 
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alter an IEP; and (3) to enforce the rights that arise out of FAPE, such as a Sec-
tion 504 claim that is premised on a denial of FAPE.54 Following this “relief-
centered” approach, the Stewart I court reasoned that it could not conclude on 
the record that Stewart sought “compensatory or prospective forms of educa-
tional relief” also available under the IDEA.55 Consequently, the court conclud-
ed that because Stewart sought monetary relief, rather than equitable compensa-
tion, the exhaustion requirement under Section 1415(l) did not apply to Stew-
art’s Section 504 claim. 56 
To reach the opposite conclusion, the dissent in Stewart I focused on 
the detailed remedial scheme in the IDEA, including the requirement that 
plaintiffs must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to bringing court 
proceedings.57 Because Stewart’s allegation that the school district misman-
aged her IEP “is a creature, not of § 504, but of the IDEA,” dissenting Judge 
Patrick Higginbotham reasoned that Stewart’s Section 504 claim fell within 
the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements.58 The dissent emphasized that Stewart 
attempted to avoid the administrative exhaustion requirement under the 
IDEA by seeking monetary damages, a remedy not available under the 
IDEA.59 Moreover, Judge Higginbotham argued that the majority’s holding 
allows disabled students to avoid exhaustion by simply waiting to bring 
damages until administrative remedies are no longer useful.60 According to 
the dissent, the majority’s holding creates a slippery slope problem with the 
potential to “gut the exhaustion requirement of all meaning.”61 
Because the Fifth Circuit later vacated the Stewart I opinion, the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas has the significant task of 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. The Ninth Circuit adopted the relief-centered approach as proposed by the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) in an amicus curiae brief. See id.; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10, Payne, 653 F.3d 863 (No. 07-35115). In the amicus brief, 
the DOJ stressed that IDEA exhaustion serves an important purpose in these three enumerated 
situations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
supra, at 22. 
 55 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 529. As pled, the plaintiff sought monetary damages for past physical 
pain, medical expenses, physical impairment, and past and future mental health expenses. Id. 
 56 Id. at 530; see Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006); 
supra note 20 and accompanying text (collecting cases holding that monetary damages are una-
vailable under the IDEA). 
 57 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 531–32 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A), 
1415(l); see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was intended to channel disputes . . . into an adminis-
trative process that could apply administrators’ expertise . . . [to] promptly resolve grievances.”). 
 58 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 531 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that the IDEA requires every covered student to have an IEP). 
 59 Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 531 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Instead, according to the dissent, 
Stewart and her parents or guardians should have contacted the school district about the alleged 
instances of sexual abuse. Id. at 532. 
 60 See id. at 534. 
 61 Id. 
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reexamining the applicability of IDEA exhaustion in this case.62 In determin-
ing whether administrative exhaustion will be dispositive of the entire matter, 
the court will likely focus on the question of whether the relief sought by 
Stewart is also available under the IDEA.63 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD APPLY THE RELIEF-CENTERED 
APPROACH IN DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF IDEA EXHAUSTION 
Although the Fifth Circuit was correct to rely on the Ninth Circuit’s re-
lief-centered approach in Stewart v. Waco Independent School District (“Stewart 
I”), the court relied on flawed reasoning, and thus reached the incorrect result 
regarding IDEA exhaustion.64 This Part begins by arguing that courts should 
adopt the Ninth Circuit’s relief-centered approach because, compared to the 
injury-centered approach, it best balances competing policy concerns. 65 This 
Part then argues that, on remand, the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas ought to apply the relief-centered approach to find that Stewart 
was required to administratively exhaust her Section 504 claim under the 
IDEA.66 
There are critical and competing policy concerns that underlie the issue 
of IDEA exhaustion for double-covered students.67 First, requiring IDEA stu-
dents to exhaust their Section 504 claims could result in closing “both the 
doors of the hearing room and courtroom” for plaintiffs.68 This would put 
IDEA students at a disadvantage to other students who are able to bring their 
Section 504 claims straight to court without exhaustion.69 Moreover, requir-
ing exhaustion would preclude a school district from liability for violating a 
plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights.70 On the other hand, allowing 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Stewart II, No 11-51067, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1 (5th Cir. June 3, 2013). 
 63 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 528–30 (explaining that a court’s examination of IDEA exhaus-
tion requires an inquiry into whether the relief sought is also available under the IDEA); see also 
Stewart II, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1 (instructing the district court to focus on the issue of IDEA 
exhaustion). 
 64 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d 513, 529, 531 (5th Cir.), opinion vacated and superseded on reh’g, 
No. 11-51067, 2013 WL 2398860, at *1 (5th Cir. June 3, 2013); Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 
F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 65 See infra notes 67–80 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 67 See Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2002); Maher, supra note 3, at 284. 
 68 See Maher, supra note 3, at 283. If the court cannot hear an IDEA student’s Section 504 
claim because that student has failed to exhaust, then that student will be barred from recovery. Id. 
Similarly, if an IDEA student brings a Section 504 claim to an IDEA administrative hearing, that 
hearing officer may lack jurisdiction to hear Section 504 claims, again barring recovery. Id. 
 69 See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1079, 1112 (2002). Because the emphasis of the IDEA is on educational services, the IDEA is 
often deficient as a remedial mechanism for Section 504 harassment claims. See id. 
 70 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 877 (“If the school’s conduct constituted a violation of laws other 
than the IDEA, a plaintiff is entitled to hold the school responsible under those other laws.”). 
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students to sit on their claims in order to avoid administrative exhaustion 
would burden the courts and increase the costs imposed on school districts.71 
As raised by the school district in Stewart I, a finding that exhaustion is not 
required would “permit a [double-covered] student . . . to delay seeking any 
remedy under IDEA . . . only to, years later, bring a suit for failure to appro-
priately modify the IEP.”72 
Given these competing policy concerns, courts should adopt the Ninth 
Circuit’s relief-centered approach because it best balances the interests of 
plaintiffs and school districts.73 To achieve this balance, the relief-centered 
approach focuses on a plaintiff’s prayer for relief and considers whether the 
relief sought is also available under the IDEA.74 This approach ensures that 
school officials are not temporarily shielded “from all liability for conduct 
that violates constitutional and statutory rights that exist independent of the 
IDEA and entitle[ ] a plaintiff to relief different from what is available under 
the IDEA.”75 Moreover, the relief-centered approach has important limita-
tions to ensure that plaintiffs cannot evade the exhaustion requirement by 
artfully limiting their relief to a request for damages.76  
The relief-centered approach is superior to the injury-centered ap-
proach, which requires IDEA exhaustion for any case that falls within the 
general “field” of educating disabled students.77 Under the injury-centered 
approach, double-covered students have little protection because this ap-
proach broadly requires IDEA exhaustion for non-IDEA claims.78 Deter-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Polera 288 F.3d at 490; see also Freedman, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that the 
IDEA imposes large costs—$110 billion per year—and these costs will rise with increased litiga-
tion). 
 72 Petition for Rehearing En Banc for Appellee at 12, supra note 6, at 12; see Polera, 288 F.3d 
at 490. 
 73 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 529; Payne, 653 F.3d at 874; supra notes 52–54 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the relief-centered approach). 
 74 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 529; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining 
that the relief-centered approach examines whether the plaintiff actually sought relief under the 
IDEA, as opposed to whether the plaintiff could have sought relief under the IDEA). 
 75 Payne, 635 F.3d at 877–78. In Payne, the court reasoned that “nothing in the IDEA protects 
a school from non-IDEA liability simply because [the school] was making a good-faith attempt to 
educate its disabled students.” Id. 
 76 See id. at 875. Under the relief-centered approach, plaintiffs must administratively exhaust 
their non-IDEA claims when the plaintiffs are seeking (1) an IDEA remedy, or its functional 
equivalent; (2) injunctive relief to alter an IEP; or (3) rights that arise out of FAPE. See id. 
 77 See id.; supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the injury-centered approach); cf. 
McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying the 
injury-centered approach and reasoning that courts should require IDEA exhaustion if a plaintiff 
alleged injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures 
and remedies) (emphasis added). 
 78 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 876–877; cf. Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1063 
(10th Cir. 2002) (applying the injury-centered approach and holding that the plaintiff was preclud-
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mining whether exhaustion is required necessarily requires courts to engage 
in an inappropriate level of in-depth speculation to infer that any double-
covered student’s request for monetary damages will be directed towards 
forms of relief that would be available under the IDEA.79 Courts should not 
engage in such sweeping assumptions that any disabled student seeking 
monetary damages requires this relief as reimbursement for expenditures on 
private special education.80 
On remand in Stewart II, the district court should apply the relief-
centered approach to find that Stewart needed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies.81 Although Stewart’s monetary claim is not available under the 
IDEA, the relief-centered approach requires IDEA exhaustion whenever a 
plaintiff seeks to enforce a right that arises out of FAPE.82 Stewart’s Section 
504 claim seeks to enforce a right that arises out of FAPE because it is 
based on the contention that the school district acted with gross misjudg-
ment in the administration of Stewart’s IEP.83 Accordingly, even under the 
relief-centered approach, Stewart was required to administratively exhaust 
her Section 504 claim under the IDEA.84 
                                                                                                                           
ed from bringing a disability discrimination claim in federal court because the plaintiff did not 
exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA). 
 79 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 876–877; cf. Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at 1063, 1068 (inferring that the 
plaintiff’s discrimination claim and request for monetary damages required IDEA exhaustion 
because the discrimination claim was based on injuries arising in the educational context). The 
court in Payne noted that such speculation is even more egregious when conducted at the motion 
to dismiss or summary judgment stage of pleadings. See 653 F.3d at 876–877. The district court 
ought to bear in mind this caveat when determining which approach to apply on remand. See id. 
 80 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 876–877; see also supra note 19 (discussing reimbursement damag-
es available under the IDEA). 
 81 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517; Payne 653 F.3d at 875. Though Stewart I applied the relief-
centered approach, it relied on flawed reasoning. See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 530; Payne 653 F.3d at 
875. The court failed to consider that the relief-centered approach requires IDEA exhaustion when 
a plaintiff’s Section 504 claim is premised on a denial of FAPE. See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 530; 
Payne 653 F.3d at 875. Furthermore, on remand, the school district has argued that the court 
should apply the injury-centered rule that exhaustion applies “when a plaintiff seeks relief for 
injuries that could have been addressed ‘to any degree’ under the IDEA.” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. 
Motion Presenting Defenses, supra note 49, at 8. Though this reasoning would achieve the correct 
conclusion that Stewart was required to exhaust her administrative remedies, this would require 
the district court to speculate that Stewart’s prayer for monetary damages was intended to be di-
rected towards compensatory forms of relief available under the IDEA. See Payne, 653 F.3d at 
876–77; supra note 79 and accompanying text (arguing that this level of speculation is inappropri-
ate). Instead of basing its reasoning on inferences, the district court should follow the Stewart I 
court’s directive to utilize the relief-centered approach. See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 531. 
 82 See Payne, 653 F.3d at 875; supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing which sce-
narios require IDEA exhaustion under the relief-centered approach). 
 83 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517; Payne, 653 F.3d at 875; supra note 16 and accompanying 
text (explaining that to receive a FAPE as defined by the IDEA, a student’s IEP must be reasona-
bly calculated to provide educational benefit). 
 84 See Stewart I, 711 F.3d at 517; Payne, 653 F.3d at 875. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court’s decision in Stewart v. Waco Independent School District had 
serious implications for school districts: a student could have held a school liable 
for gross mismanagement of her IEP without exhausting her administrative rem-
edies under the IDEA. Such a lenient interpretation of the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement could expose school districts to an increased amount of costly liti-
gation. Because Stewart’s Section 504 claim was couched within the IDEA, on 
remand, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas ought to find 
that IDEA exhaustion is dispositive in this case. The district court should apply 
the relief-centered approach to determine the necessity of IDEA exhaustion, and 
should find that Stewart’s Section 504 claim required IDEA exhaustion because 
it sought to enforce a right that arose out of the IDEA’s “free appropriate public 
education.” In doing so, the district court will avoid a decision that would allow 
double-covered students to engage in artful pleading to avoid IDEA exhaustion 
in order to receive monetary damages. 
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